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EX ANTE UP: COMBATTING PROBLEM 
GAMBLING AND ITS HARMS IN JAPAN 
AHEAD OF THE LEGALIZATION OF 
CASINOS 
Verin W. Valdez* 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern nations across the globe—including the United States, Australia, 
China, and Singapore—permit casino gambling in some form, but in Japan 
gambling remains a crime under Chapter XXIII of Penal Code Act No. 45 of 
1907.1 Specifically, Chapter XXIII punishes any person engaged in the 
following acts: gambling, habitual gambling, and operating a place for 
gambling, or organizing a group of habitual gamblers for profit.2 This provision 
implicitly outlaws any casino or other type of gambling hall.3 Chapter XXIII 
also penalizes any person involved in the sale, delivery, or receipt of lottery 
tickets; however, betting on horse racing, bicycles, and speedboats is legal.4 
In April 2010, Japanese lawmakers began promoting legislation that would 
permit the establishment of casinos in Japan.5 Lawmakers primarily sought to 
boost the economy in Japan, which had been waning and continues to stagnate.6 
                                                            
* © 2016 Verin W. Valdez. J.D. 2016, University of San Diego School of Law. 
The author would like to thank Kelsey Quigley and Bradley Harris for their 
guidance. 
1  See KEIHŌ [KEIHŌ] [PEN. C.] 1907, art. 185–87 (Japan); see also Kenji Saito & 
Norika Yuasa, Gaming Law: Consideration of Japanese Gaming Law, IFLR.COM 
(Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3007248/ Gaming-law-Consideration-
of-Japanese-Gaming-Law.html. 
2  See KEIHŌ [KEIHŌ] [PEN. C.] 1907, art. 185–86 (Japan). 
3  See id. at art. 186. 
4   See id. at art. 187; see also Kyla Ryan, Casinos and Japan’s Gambling 
Addiction, THE DIPLOMAT (Sept. 23, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/ 
casinos-and-japans-gambling-addiction. 
5  See Saito & Yuasa, supra note 1. 
6   See Euan McKirdy, Is Japan Betting Big on the Legalization of Casinos?, 
CNN.COM (May 15, 2014, 1:57 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/14/ 
world/asia/japan-casinos/index.html. 
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Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party continue 
to be proponents of the legalization of gambling as part of the Prime Minister’s 
economic plan, popularly deemed “Abenomics.”7 The Japanese economy 
initially saw positive results out of Abenomics, but there has been no real 
growth in Japan’s gross domestic product since 2009.8 
These proponents assert that legal gambling will increase tourism and will 
result in annual Japan gaming revenue totaling as much as $40 billion by 2025.9 
Lawmakers have not yet proposed a tax structure, but they have stated that the 
tax rate will not be as low as Singapore (12.5–22.5%) and not as high as Macau 
(35–39%), which will mean a sizable tax income for Japan.10 Aside from taxes, 
this estimated gaming revenue would make Japan the second largest gambling 
market in Asia, right behind Macau.11 Foreign international casino firms, such 
as Wynn Resorts, Las Vegas Sands, MGM Resorts, and Melco Crown 
Entertainment, have been eager to invest billions of dollars in Japan to expand 
their international presence—just as many have successfully done in Macau 
and Singapore.12 
                                                            
7  See Stephen Harner, Abenomics Leading to Crisis? Post-’Collective Security,’ 
With Support Plunging, Abe Gambles On Casinos, FORBES.COM (July 27, 2014, 
4:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2014/ 07/27/abenomics-
leading-to-crisis-post-collective-security-with-support-plunging-abe-gambles-on-
casinos. 
8  See Chen Zhao, Abenomics Won’t Work. And That’s Ok., BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(Aug. 11, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/ 2016-08-
11/abenomics-won-t-work-and-that-s-ok; see also Muhammad Cohen, Japan 
Forms Casino Task Force to Boost Flagging Momentum, FORBES.COM (Aug. 25, 
2014, 1:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ muhammadcohen/2014/08/25/japan-
forms-casino-task-force-to-boost-flagging-momentum. 
9  See Brian Fowler & Isabel Reynolds, Abe Says LDP Aiming to Pass Japan’s 
Casino Law in Autumn, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 25, 2014, 1:51 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-24/abe-says-ldp-aiming-to-pass-japan-
casino-legislation-in-autumn.html. 
10  See Cohen, supra note 8; see also Dominic B. Silva, The Great International 
Expansion of Gaming, VALUELINE.COM (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.valueline.com/ 
Stocks/Commentaries/The_Great_International_Expansion_of_Gaming.aspx. 
11  See Fowler & Reynolds, supra note 9. 
12  In fact, the Japanese market is so appealing that LVS is prepared to make a $10 
billion investment and has already begun opening offices and hiring employees in 
Japan. Sheldon Adelson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of LVS, said at a 
media event in Japan, “We will spend whatever it takes.” In 2013, Bill Hornbuckle, 
President of MGM Resorts, said it would invest “several” billion dollars, and 
Gamal Aziz, Development Chief Operating Officer of Wynn Resorts, said it would 
invest much more than $4 billion dollars, which is the amount it spent in Macau. 
See Ritsuko Ando, Costs, Politics Erode Chances for a Tokyo Casino by 2020, 
REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2014, 12:35 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/ 
09/29/us-japan-gambling-tokyo-idUSKCN0HO09F20140929; see also Jonathan 
DeHart, Casinos in Tokyo: An Olympic-Sized Cash Cow?, THE DIPLOMAT (Sept. 
30, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/casinos-in-tokyo-an-olympic-sized-
cash- cow; see also Jacob Adelman, Yuki Yamaguchi & Vinicy Chan, Las Vegas 
Sands Ready to Invest $10 Billion in Japan Casino, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24, 2014, 
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In August 2011, legalization proponents announced the Draft Act 
Regarding the Promotion of the Development of Integrated Resort Areas 
(“Draft Act”).13 The Draft Act concerns the development of a government 
system that will allow for the creation of Integrated Resorts (“IR”).14 IRs are 
privately operated establishments that integrate casinos and other facilities that 
contribute to the promotion of tourism.15 The goal is to ensure that Integrated 
Resort Areas, which are government-approved areas permitting the location of 
IRs, become successful tourist destinations that are internationally competitive, 
benefit local economies, and generate tax revenues.16 Two to three major cities 
in Japan, such as Tokyo and Osaka, are likely to establish Integrated Resort 
Areas first, with smaller and more remote cities to follow.17 
Supporters hoped the National Diet, the Japanese national legislature, 
would pass the Draft Act by the end of 2014 in order to start the process and 
reach the goal of having functional IRs before Japan hosts the 2020 Olympics 
in Tokyo.18 In December 2013, lawmakers introduced the Draft Act into the 
Diet, but it did not come to a vote before the sessions ended in 2014 due to the 
lack of deliberation time.19 In subsequent sessions, supporters abandoned the 
pursuit of passing the Draft Act; however, the July 2016 elections gave 
majority control over the Diet to the Liberal Democratic Party and thus, the 
ability to pass almost any legislation it desires without the support of any other 
party.20 While the proposition of legalizing gambling is not new in Japan, given 
                                                            
12:30 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-24/las-vegas-sands-ready-
to-invest-10-billion-in-japan-casino.html. 
13  See Saito & Yuasa, supra note 1; see generally Sōgō rizōto no kaihatsu no 
suishin ni kansuru hōan [Draft Act Regarding the Promotion of the Development of 
Integrated Resort Areas], 185 SEITI HŌRITSU 29 (Japan) [hereinafter Draft Act]; see 
also Masahiro Shiga & Dale Caldwell, Japan’s National Diet Considers Casino 
Legislation, MOFO.COM (Feb. 2014), http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/ 
1402-Japan-Natural-Diet-Casino-Legislation.pdf. 
14  See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 2.1; see also Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13, 
at 1. 
15  See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 2.1; see also Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13, 
at 2. 
16  See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 1, 2.2, 3, 6, 7; see also Shiga & Caldwell, 
supra note 13, at 1–2. 
17  See Isabel Reynolds & Maiko Takahashi, Japan Casino Bill Set to Pass Next 
Month, Lawmaker Says, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2014, 12:38 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-30/japan-casino-bill-set-to-pass-next-
month-lawmaker-says.html; see also Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13, at 1. 
18  See Reynolds & Takahashi, supra note 17. 
19   See Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13, at 1; Japan Ruling Coalition Shelves 
Casino Enabling Bill Vote, GGRASIA.COM (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.ggrasia. 
com/japans-ruling-parties-shelve-vote-on-casino-enabling-bill. 
20  See Eric Johnston, Diet May Take Up Gambling Bill Again, but Odds Are Low 
Japan Will See Casinos by 2020, THE JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/02/19/national/diet-may-take-up-
gambling-bill-again-but-odds-are-low-japan-will-see-casinos-by-2020; see also 
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its socially conservative politics, this is the closest it has come to fruition.21 
However, the future of the Draft Act is still unknown, and it is unclear if the 
Olympic goal is still attainable. 
Clearly, the main legal issue of the Draft Act is the casino portion of the 
IR. While the Draft Act’s passage will not make gambling legal, it will pave the 
way for further legislation within one year, effectively lifting the current ban on 
gambling.22 Opponent groups have fought against the legalization of gambling 
for years, claiming that it would produce organized crime, money laundering, 
and gambling addiction.23 The Draft Act certainly reflects these concerns, as in 
Article 10 “Regulations on Establishment and Operation of Casino Facilities,” 
which vaguely states that the national government shall address certain matters 
like crime prevention, advertisement regulations, protection of minors, and 
adverse effects on visitors of casino facilities.24 The goal for these measures is 
to prevent improper acts at casino facilities within IRs, and to eliminate other 
adverse effects that may result therefrom.25 
To combat problem gambling and other social harms derived from 
gambling in Japan, lawmakers will have to decide which regulations to enact 
before establishing IRs. Regulations enacted ex ante raise issues including (1) 
whether regulation will, as desired, forestall problem gambling and gambling 
disorder amongst Japanese citizens and residents; (2) whether regulation will 
adversely affect the economic potential of casinos by limiting the local market; 
and (3) whether problem gambling will even be a statistically significant 
problem. Ultimately, Japan will have to decide whether to address potential 
problem gambling with regulations on an ex ante basis or ex post basis. 
This Article seeks to provide guidance to the Diet by exploring how the 
legislatures of the world’s top gaming markets have addressed similar issues. 
The Article first provides brief histories of the legalization of casino gambling 
in Macau, Las Vegas, and Singapore. This Article then compares each market 
and provides a recommendation to the Diet regarding the following regulations: 
(1) entry levies, (2) age restrictions, (3) regulation of extension of gambling 
credit, and (4) exclusion. 
                                                            
Jasmine Solana, Casino Legislation Back on the Table as Japan’s LDP Holds 
Outright Majority, CALVINAYRE.COM (July 28, 2016), http://calvinayre.com/2016/ 
07/28/casino/casino-legislation-back-on-the-table-as-japans-ldp-holds-outright-
majority. 
21  See Harner, supra note 7. 
22   See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 5; see also Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13, 
at 1. 
23  See Reynolds & Takahashi, supra note 17. 
24   See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 10(4), (6)–(8); see also Shiga & Caldwell, 
supra note 13, at 3. 
25  See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 10; see also Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13, 
at 3. 
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I. BRIEF CASE STUDIES ON THE LEGALIZATION OF GAMBLING 
The top gaming markets in the world by annual revenue are Macau, Las 
Vegas, and Singapore, in descending order. Macau remains the largest casino 
gaming market, with annual revenues of USD $29 billion in 2015—close to 
two and six times the 2015 revenues of Las Vegas and Singapore, 
respectively.26 Las Vegas is the second largest gaming market with annual 
revenues of about $15 billion in 2015.27 Singapore is the third largest gaming 
market with annual revenues of almost USD $5 billion in 2015.28 
Interestingly, these three markets have legalized gambling and casino 
gaming differently, especially in terms of time and approach. However, they 
each faced changing governments and economic conditions that played roles in 
the legalization process. The present contemplation of legalization in Japan is 
comparable to that of these markets in the past. These histories provide a 
background to the markets’ current regulatory schemes and what could be the 
regulatory schemes of Japan in the near future. 
A. Macau 
Macau is a city located on a small piece of land measuring about 10 square 
miles on the southwestern coast of China along the South China Sea, and about 
an hour west of Hong Kong by ferry.29 
For 440 years, Portugal retained Macau as a colony, and legalized 
gambling in the colony in 1847.30 On December 20, 1999, Portugal returned 
Macau to China, which designated the territory a Special Administrative 
Region of China.31 As a Special Administrative Region, under the “one 
country, two systems” framework of China, Macau maintains more social and 
economic autonomy than other areas of China.32 As such, gambling remained 
legal in Macau upon its return to China and remains illegal in all other parts of 
                                                            
26  See Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune, GAMING INSPECTION & 
COORDINATION BUREAU (2015), http://www.dicj.gov. mo/web/en/information/ 
DadosEstat_mensal/2015/index.html; see also NEV. GAMING CONTROL BOARD, 
GAMING REVENUE REPORT A-01 (2016), http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/ 
showdocument.aspx?documentid=10810; Singapore Casino Revenue Expected to 
Decline in 2016, YOGONET.COM (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.yogonet.com/ 
international/2016/ 01/04/singapore-casino-revenue-expected-to-decline-in-2016. 
27  See NEV. GAMING CONTROL BOARD, supra note 26. 
28  See YOGONET.COM, supra note 26. 
29   See Davis Ka-Chio Fong & Bernadete Ozorio, Gambling Participation and 
Prevalence Estimates of Pathological Gambling in a Far-East Gambling City: 
Macao, 9 UNLV GAMING RESEARCH & REV. J. 15, 15 (2005). 
30   See id.; see also Macao Gaming History, GAMING INSPECTION & 
COORDINATION BUREAU, http://www.dicj.gov.mo/web/en/history/ index.html. 
31  See Macao Gaming History, supra note 30. 
32  See Fong & Ozorio, supra note 29. 
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the country.33 
Between 1962 and 2001, a company named Sociedade de Turismo e 
Diversões de Macao (“STDM”) maintained a monopoly concession on casinos 
given to it by the colonial government.34 When this monopoly concession 
expired, the new government allowed outside investors to bid multiple 
concessions.35 The government abandoned the monopoly model, citing 
concerns about STDM’s control over the government, lack of improvements to 
the gaming facilities, gambling-related crime, and the return of Macau to 
China.36 A subsidiary of STDM named Sociedade de Jogos de Macau (“SJM”), 
Wynn Resorts, and Galaxy Entertainment each won a concession.37 The new 
framework also permitted SJM, Wynn Resorts, and Galaxy Entertainment to 
sell sub-concessions, which they did to Las Vegas Sands, MGM Resorts, and 
Melco Crown Entertainment, respectively.38 These 2002 concessions are still in 
effect and are set to expire in 2020; however, after the expiration of the 
concessions, the concessionaires can request renewals.39 
Today, the concessionaries operate thirty-six casinos in Macau: twenty by 
SJM; six by Galaxy Entertainment; five by Las Vegas Sands; four by Melco 
Crown Entertainment; two by Wynn Resorts; and one by MGM Resorts.40 
Other legal non-casino gambling activities in Macau include pari-mutuel 
(betting on greyhound racing and thoroughbred horse racing), lottery and 
instant games, and sports betting, which account for a small percentage of 
overall revenue.41 
B. Las Vegas 
Las Vegas is a city located in Clark County, Nevada, in the United States 
of America.42 The State of Nevada has a history of gambling legislation marked 
by many shifts between legalization and prohibition and by regulation and 
deregulation. 
During the 19th century, when Nevada was merely a western frontier, 
                                                            
33  See Macao Gaming History, supra note 30. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  See Clarissa Chan, Gaming Tourism Trend in Macau, UNIV. OF GUELPH (Feb. 8, 
2012), https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10214/3649/Trend_ 
report_Macau_gaming_trend.pdf. 
37  See Macao Gaming History, supra note 30. 
38  Id. 
39  See Chan, supra note 36. 
40  See Macao Gaming History, supra note 30. 
41   See id.; see also Quarterly Gaming Statistics, Gross Revenue from Different 
Gaming Activities, GAMING INSPECTION & COORDINATION BUREAU, 
http://www.dicj.gov.mo/web/en/information/DadosEstat/ 2015/content.html. 
42   See About Clark County, CLARK COUNTY, NV (last visited Dec. 12, 2016), 
http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/pages/about.aspx. 
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widespread gambling occurred, particularly in mining camps.43 However, in 
1861, the legislature of the Nevada territory banned all forms of gambling by 
enacting the Nevada Territorial Act of 1861, which provided for criminal 
penalties.44 People mostly ignored the law and continued to gamble openly, 
generally in the form of faro, poker, and roulette.45 In 1864, Nevada joined the 
Union and its new State Constitution did not mention gambling.46 In 1865, the 
state legislature repealed the Nevada Territorial Act of 1861, but passed a new 
act that upheld the ban on gambling, and only reduced the penalties for 
violation.47 
In 1869, the state legislature overrode the governor’s veto to pass a bill, 
that legalized gambling but only provided for minimal regulation.48 Economic 
factors—city and county revenues from licensing fees—played an important 
role in passing the bill, as well as its several amendments.49 Indeed, when the 
economy was down, support for gaming increased because it provided 
necessary revenues.50 However, when the economy was buttressed by the 
mining industry, people looked at gaming as a vice.51 
The changing economics and sentiments toward gaming continued to keep 
legalization in flux. Forty years later, the state legislature enacted a law that 
again prohibited all forms of gambling, only to repeal it a year later.52 Then, in 
1912, the legislature reinstated prohibition, although it was unevenly enforced 
and illegal gambling establishments continued to operate in many cities.53 
Finally, in 1931, the state legislature passed the last piece of legislation 
regarding gambling legalization in Nevada, Assembly Bill 98, which has 
provided for legal gambling in Nevada ever since.54 
                                                            
43   See RESEARCH DIV., NEV. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, POLICY AND 
PROGRAM REPORT, GAMING IN NEVADA 1 (2016), http://www.leg.state.nv.us/ 
Division/Research/Publications/PandPReport/2016PandPReport.pdf. 
44  See id.; see also Ben Hetfeld, The Legislative History of Gambling, 1861–1915, 
UNLV THESES, DISSERTATIONS, PROF. PAPERS, & CAPSTONES 13 (2000), 
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1455&context=thesesdissertations. 
45  See RESEARCH DIV., supra note 43, at 1–2. 
46   The Nevada State Constitution did ban lotteries, but did not provide for any 
punishment for its violation until the Lottery Act of 1873. See Hetfeld, supra note 
44, at 15. 
47  Id. 
48  See RESEARCH DIV., supra note 43, at 2. 
49  See Hetfeld, supra 44 at 18–20, 23, 32–36. 
50  See id. at 23. 
51  See id. at 33. 
52  See RESEARCH DIV., supra note 43, at 2. 
53  Id. 
54  Id. at 2–3. 
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C. Singapore 
Singapore is a small archipelago nation measuring 268 square miles and 
located off the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula in the Indian Ocean.55 
Singapore banned casino gambling when it became an independent 
republic in 1965; however, the country later permitted some gambling 
activities.56 In 1968, Singapore’s lottery began operating and introducing 
games over the next two decades.57 In 1999, Singapore began permitting sports 
betting on local football games, and in 2002, the country expanded sports 
betting to include international football.58 Over the course of its history, the 
country has also permitted other gambling activities such as betting on horse 
racing, club slot machines, and casino cruises in international waters.59 
Over these decades, Singapore rejected multiple requests to change its 
legal position on casino gambling.60 However, in April 2004, Singapore’s 
Parliament announced that it would reconsider the ban on casinos in an effort to 
boost the economy.61 The government felt that Singapore needed to reinvent 
itself to regain its international competitiveness as a tourist and business 
destination.62 Government officials made formal visits to other locations where 
casino gaming was legal to conduct research on operations and regulations.63 
In November 2005, the government issued a request for bid proposals from 
interested developers.64 One year later, the government announced its approval 
for two IRs, which were defined as projects with the components and amenities 
for “Meetings, Incentive, Convention, and Exposition.”65 The goal was to 
create resorts that would become tourist destinations in their own right.66 There 
would be two locations for the new IRs: Marina Bay, a tract of land in a new 
downtown zone next to Singapore’s Central Business District, and Sentosa, an 
offshore island accessible from the main island by road and monorail.67 
                                                            
55   See Singapore, WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIONS, http://www. 
encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/singapore-
0 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
56   See Joan C. Henderson, Developing and Regulating Casinos: The Case of 
Singapore, 12 TOURISM & HOSPITALITY RES. 139, 141 (2012). 
57   See Singapore Gaming Summary, UNIV. OF NEV., L. V., CTR. FOR GAMING 
RESEARCH (May 7, 2014, 9:48 AM), http://gaming.unlv.edu/abstract/ 
singapore.html [hereinafter Singapore Gaming Summary]. 
58  Id. 
59  See Henderson, supra note 56, at 142. 
60  Id. at 141. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  See Singapore Gaming Summary, supra note 57. 
65   See Henderson, supra note 56 at 141; see also Singapore Gaming Summary, 
supra note 57. 
66  See Singapore Gaming Summary, supra note 57. 
67   See Henderson, supra note 56 at 141; see also Singapore Gaming Summary, 
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In March 2006, the government closed its request for proposals and chose 
Las Vegas Sands and Genting PLC as the IR developers and operators.68 
Nearly four years later, Genting PLC developed Resorts World Sentosa, which 
covers 47 hectares and cost $5.2 billion.69 A few months thereafter, Las Vegas 
Sands opened Marina Bay Sands, which covers 15.5 hectares of land and cost 
$5.5 billion.70 These IRs remain the only two permitted by law in Singapore.71 
II. ENTRY LEVY 
An entry levy is a fee a patron must pay to gain admission to a casino. 
Singapore is the only gaming market discussed herein that imposes an entry 
levy.72 According to the Singapore Casino Regulatory Authority (“CRA”), 
“The entry levy system is one of the casino safeguard measures put in place to 
protect Singaporeans [Citizens] and Permanent Residents (“SCPR”). It is meant 
to remind SCPRs that gambling is an expense and not a way to make a 
living.”73 Generally, the entry levy seems to affect both the rates of gambling 
participation and the prevalence of gambling problems among residents.74 
A. Singapore 
The Casino Control Act (“CCA”) of Singapore imposes an entry levy on 
SCPRs.75 The CCA provides that a casino operator shall not allow an SCPR to 
enter or remain on its premises and participate in gambling activities at any 
time, without paying the entry levy.76 The punishment for not paying the entry 
levy or for remaining after the expiration of any paid access period includes a 
criminal conviction, with a fine of up to S$1,000, plus the cost of the levy.77 
The entry levy costs S$100 per twenty-four hour period of access, or 
S$2,000 for an annual membership with a casino.78 The patron can pay the 
entry levy in advance of his or her actual visit; however, a twenty-four hour 
access entry levy expires if not used within thirty days, and an annual 
                                                            
supra note 57. 
68  See Henderson, supra note 56 at 141; see also Singapore Gaming Summary, 
supra note 57. 
69  See Henderson, supra note 56 at 141. 
70  Id. 
71   See Casino Control Act (Cap 33A, 2007 rev. ed.) at 41(1) (Sing.) [hereinafter 
CCA]; see also Singapore Gaming Summary, supra note 57. 
72  See infra Section II.A. 
73   See FAQ Why do I need to purchase an entry levy to enter a casino?, CASINO 
REG. AUTH., http://www.ifaq.gov.sg/CRA/apps/fcd_faqmain. aspx#FAQ_33950 
(Sing.). 
74  See infra Section II.A. 
75  See generally CCA, supra note 71, at 116. 
76  Id. at 116(1). 
77  Id. at 116(6). 
78  Id. at 116(1). 
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membership begins to run ninety days after purchase, even if the patron did not 
visit any casino.79 On a monthly basis, the casinos turn over these entry levies 
to the Singapore Totalisator Board, which uses the funds for social or charitable 
purposes in Singapore.80 
A casino operator may not pay for the entry levy for an SCPR, nor refund 
or reimburse him or her for the entry levy in any manner; the operator also may 
not give any right, privilege, discount, or benefit in addition to entry to the 
premises for the payment of the entry levy.81 Moreover, casino operators may 
not change the specified timeframes provided for prepayment, allow access 
after expiration, or refund an entry levy that goes unused.82 The CRA regularly 
imposes penalties on casino operators for these breaches.83 
Data suggest that the entry levies are extremely effective in reducing 
resident casino gambling. A 2014 study revealed that while 44% of adult 
Singapore residents participated in a gambling activity in the preceding twelve 
months, only 2% of this gambling took place at IRs.84 In comparison, there 
were participation rates of 78% and 10% in the lottery and social gambling, 
respectively.85 SCPRs also decreased their average daily visits to casinos from 
20,000 visits in 2010 when the casinos opened, to 17,000 visits in 2013.86 
                                                            
79  Casino Control (Entry Levy) Regulations 2010 (GN No S 52/2010) Reg. 4(1) 
(Sing.) [hereinafter CCELR]. 
80  CCA, supra note 71, at 116(2). 
81  See CCA, supra note 71, at 116(3); see also CCELR, supra note 79, at Reg. 6. 
82  CCELR, supra note 79, Reg. 4(2)–(3). 
83   See Enforcement Actions, CASINO REG. AUTH., http://www.cra.gov.sg/cra/ 
enforcement-actions.aspx/93 (Sing.) 
For example, in September 2012, the CRA imposed the highest financial 
penalty to date of S$600,000 on Resorts World Sentosa for reimbursing annual 
entry levies through a marketing program that gave incentives such as Universal 
Studios Singapore tickets, concert tickets, and hotel accommodations to locals 
when they purchased or renewed annual memberships. In its press release for the 
matter, the CRA stated that the “entry levy is one of many social safeguards put in 
place to address problem gaming.” 
The Chief Executive of the CRA also said, “CRA is sending a clear signal to 
the operator that they should comply fully with the social safeguards put in place to 
protect locals. Compliance to our laws and regulations must be strictly adhered to 
at all times.” In addition, in February 2012, the CRA fined both Marina Bay Sands 
and Resorts World Sentosa a total of S$385,000 for allowing residents to enter 
without paying the entry levies or on expired levy payments. See CRA Imposes 
Fine of $600,000 on Resorts World for Reimbursing Annual Entry Levy, CASINO 
REG. AUTH. (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.cra.gov.sg/cra/cra-imposes-fine-of-
600000-on-resorts-world-for-reimbursing-annual-entry-levy.aspx/77 (Sing.). 
84  See NAT’L COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING, REPORT OF SURVEY ON 
PARTICIPATION IN GAMBLING ACTIVITIES AMONG SINGAPORE RESIDENTS, 2014 2, 
9 (2015), https://www.ncpg.org.sg/en/pdf/2014%20NCPG%20Gambling% 
20Participation%20Survey_FINAL.pdf (Sing.) [hereinafter SINGAPORE GAMBLING 
PARTICIPATION]. 
85  Id. at 9. 
86   See CASINO REG. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT (2013), http://www.cra.gov.sg/ 
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Further, only 7.7% of adult SCPRs visited casinos more than once within the 
first three years of their operation.87 
Singapore also has the lowest prevalence rates of gambling problems of all 
the markets discussed herein. There are two tiers of gambling problems: 
problem gambling and gambling disorder (formerly known as pathological 
gambling), which is more severe. The American Psychiatric Association 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders includes gambling 
disorder, which it classifies as an addiction,88 and provides criteria for 
diagnosis.89 In 2014, an estimated 0.2% of adult Singapore residents were 
likely suffering from gambling disorder.90 This represented a statistically 
significant decrease from 1.4% in 2011.91 Further, an estimated 0.5% of adult 
Singapore residents were probable problem gamblers.92 This represented a 
statistically significant decrease from 1.2% in 2011.93 
B. Las Vegas 
By contrast, Nevada specifically prohibits casinos from exacting entry 
levies—with certain exceptions.94 A casino licensee that does receive the 
exceptional approval to charge a fee may not restrict admission to the area on 
                                                            
upload_files/cuteeditor/1/document/Casino%20Regulatory%20Authority%20of%2
0Singapore%20Annual%20Report%202012-2013_lr_1Oct.pdf (Sing.). 
87  Id. 
88  DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, § 312.31 (Am. 
Psychiatric Ass’n., 5th ed.) (2013). 
89  A diagnosis of gambling disorder requires the exhibition of at least four of the 
following nine criteria within the last 12 months: 
1. Needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired 
excitement. 
2. Is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling. 
3. Has made repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling. 
4. Is often preoccupied with gambling (e.g., having persistent thoughts of reliving past 
gambling experiences, handicapping or planning the next venture, thinking of ways to get 
money with which to gamble). 
5. Often gambles when feeling distressed (e.g., helpless, guilty, anxious, depressed). 
6. After losing money gambling, often returns another day to get even (“chasing” one’s 
losses). 
7. Lies to conceal the extent of involvement with gambling. 
8. Has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or educational or career opportunity 
because of gambling. 
9. Relies on others to provide money to relieve desperate financial situations caused by 
gambling. See id. 
90  See SINGAPORE GAMBLING PARTICIPATION, supra note 84, at 4. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94   However, a casino licensee can request approval to charge a fee from the 
chairman of the Nevada Gaming Control Board by submitting a form that requires 
information on thirteen points of criteria. Nev. Gaming Reg. 5.210 (2017). 
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grounds of race, color, religion, national origin, or disability.95 This provision is 
probably rooted in the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 and stands in 
stark contrast to the entry levy law of Singapore, which inherently permits 
discrimination on national origin through residency and/or citizenship.96 
Las Vegas’ rates of gambling participation and problems stand in stark 
contrast to those of Singapore.97 In 2014, 54% of Clark County residents 
participated in a gambling activity, as compared to only 44% in Singapore.98 
However, among the participating residents, 63% gambled in Las Vegas 
casinos, nearly thirty-two times the rate of Singapore residents.99 Further, 23% 
of participating residents gambled in casinos at least once a week, and 61% at 
least once a month.100 
Nevada not only has the highest prevalence rates of gambling problems, 
but also has a higher rate of the more severe gambling disorder than problem 
gambling.101 The most recent study on the prevalence of problem gambling 
shows that between 2.7% and 4.3% of adult Nevada residents could suffer from 
gambling disorder.102 In addition, between 2.2% and 3.6% of adult Nevada 
residents could be problem gamblers.103 Therefore, a combined 6.4% of adult 
Nevada residents could have a gambling problem.104 This figure increases to 
                                                            
95  Id. 
96  Id.; see generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. § 241. 
97   Many citizens and residents from all over the United States gamble in Las 
Vegas and may make them susceptible to its harms. However, this Article focuses 
on the citizens and residents of Las Vegas, and in some cases Nevada, who have 
close proximity to the casinos. This focus makes the geographic size more 
comparable to smaller areas like Macau, Singapore, and Japan. Cf. LAS VEGAS 
CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., 2016 LAS VEGAS VISITOR PROFILE 51, 57, 
http://www.lvcva.com/ includes/content/images/media/docs/2016-Las-Vegas-
Visitor-Profile.pdf, with DOCUMENTATION & INFO. CTR. OF THE STATISTICS & 
CENSUS SERV., TOURISM STATISTICS 2015 107, 116 (2016) (Mac.), 
http://www.dsec.gov.mo/getAttachment/471ff8d9-5a28-4fcd-8539-
8b374dcf2c59/E_TUR_PUB_2015_Y.aspx?disposition=attachment. 
98  LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., 2014 CLARK COUNTY RESIDENTS 
STUDY 11, http://www.lvcva.com/includes/content/ images/media/docs/2014-
Clark_County_Resident_Study.pdf. This study does not include tourists in its 
study; see supra Section II.A; SINGAPORE GAMBLING PARTICIPATION, supra note 
84. 
99  LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., supra note 98, at 24; see supra 
Section II.A; SINGAPORE GAMBLING PARTICIPATION, supra note 84, at 4. 
100  LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., supra note 98, at 24. 
101   RACHEL A. VOLBERG, GAMBLING AND PROBLEM GAMBLING IN NEVADA, 
REPORT TO THE NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES 32 (Mar. 22, 2002), 
http://www.nevadacouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/NV-Prevalence-Study-
Adults-2002.pdf. 
102  Id. at 29. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. at 46. 
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7% when looking at just adult Clark County residents.105 Interestingly, casino 
gamblers had the second-lowest rate of gambling problems, at 8.7%, just 
behind those who played the lottery, at 5.7%.106 Nonetheless, these estimates of 
gambling problems are significantly higher than the 0.7% estimate in 
Singapore.107 
As a final note, Las Vegas is unique because it permits licensed gambling 
activities similar to casino games in convenience and grocery stores, gas 
stations, bars, and restaurants.108 Indeed, between 21% and 28% of 
participating residents gamble at these locations.109 Further, gamblers that 
participated in other gaming activities, such as non-casino gaming machines, 
had higher gambling problem rates, ranging from 11.4% to 33.7%.110 
Therefore, it is plausible that Las Vegas has higher prevalence rates because it 
allows non-casino gambling, and problem gamblers frequent these locations 
more often because they are far more numerous than casinos.111 
C. Macau 
Macau does not mandate an entry levy, nor does it prohibit a casino from 
charging admission fees.112 Macau has both higher prevalence rates and 
gambling participation, particularly in casino gambling, compared to 
Singapore, but not Las Vegas.113 
According to a 2014 study, the gambling participation rate of Macau 
residents was 49.5% in 2013.114 Gambling in Macau casinos was the third most 
                                                            
105  Id. at 30. 
106  Id. at 31. 
107  See supra Section II.A; SINGAPORE GAMBLING PARTICIPATION, supra note 84, 
at 4; see LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., supra 98 at 24. 
108  See LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., supra note 98, at 31–32. 
109  Id. at 31–32. 
110  See VOLBERG, supra note 101, at 31. 
111   See supra Section II.B; LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., supra 
note 98. 
112  See generally Law No. 10/2012, infra note 152. 
113  See supra Sections II.A–B. 
114  Inst. For The Study of Commercial Gaming, Univ. Of Mac., Report on a Study 
of Macao People’s Participation in Gambling Activities 2013 (2014), 
http://iasweb.ias.gov.mo/dtj/en/annualReport/dfccvf_rs2013.pdf [hereinafter 
Macau Gambling Participation]. 
Nearly ninety-five percent of the total visitors to Macau in 2015 came from 
Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, all of which belong to China. More than 
32% of these visitors did so primarily to gamble, an increase from prior years. 
Although Chinese nationals from all over China gamble in Macau, as in Las Vegas, 
this Article focuses only on the residents of Macau where the casinos are located. 
See generally DOCUMENTATION & INFO. CTR. OF THE STATISTICS & CENSUS SERV., 
TOURISM STATISTICS 2015 107, 116 (2016) (Mac.), http://www.dsec.gov.mo/ 
getAttachment/471ff8d9-5a28-4fcd85398b374dcf2c59/E_TUR_PUB_2015_Y 
.aspx?disposition=attachment. 
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popular gambling activity amongst Macau residents with about 12% 
participating, behind the lottery and social gambling.115 While casino gambling 
among Macau residents pales in comparison to Las Vegas residents, it is six 
times that of Singapore.116 
The study also found that 1.9% of Macau residents were possible problem 
gamblers.117 Further, 0.9% of Macau residents could be suffering from 
gambling disorder.118 These figures represented a decline from prior years for 
both possible problem gamblers and gambling disorder.119 However, the 
average rates are nearly double those of Singapore, but about half those of Las 
Vegas.120 
Macau residents with a gambling problem participated in gambling at 
Macanese casinos more frequently than any other gambling activity.121 Macao 
residents who gambled in Macanese casinos were 8.6 times more likely to 
become possible problem gamblers or suffer from gambling disorder than those 
who did not.122 Macanese casinos likely have a much greater effect on 
prevalence rates of problem gambling than Las Vegas because these are the 
only locations where casino games are available, as in Singapore. 
D. Recommendation for Japan 
The comparison between Singapore, Las Vegas, and Macau supports the 
proposition that entry levies may be effective in reducing the participation in 
casino gambling amongst residents. An entry levy in Japan seems likely as 
Article 13 of the Draft Act, “Admission,” states that visitors may have to pay 
for admission to casino facilities.123 Japanese lawmakers previously said that 
the preferred model for casino regulation in Japan is Singapore and suggested 
that IRs would charge Japanese citizens and permanent residents an entry levy, 
but not foreigners.124 
Entry levies may be too effective in keeping locals out of casinos, even 
those that are unlikely to ever become problem gamblers. Indeed, analysts 
suggest that the casino market in Singapore already reached its maximum, and 
because the rigid restrictions on locals is a unique issue to that market, there 
                                                            
115  See Macau Gambling Participation, supra note 114. 
116  See supra Section II.B. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
120  See supra Sections II.A-B. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. 
123  See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 13; see also Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13, 
at 2. 
124  See Reynolds & Takahashi, supra note 17. 
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will be a negative growth rate unless casinos tap into the local market.125 Data 
suggest that the local casino gambling market in Japan has the potential to be 
significant. Without casinos, the gambling participation rate in Japan is 
approximately 65.6%.126 Further, the second most popular gambling activity is 
pachinko, a game similar to a slot machine found in casinos, behind playing the 
lottery.127 
However, data also show that problem gambling is already an issue in 
Japan without casinos. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in Japan 
funded a study that showed 4.8% of the adult population might have gambling 
disorder.128 Thus, the prevalence rate of gambling disorder in Japan is the 
highest of all the gaming markets without the presence of casinos.129 Further, 
pachinko is the first gambling choice of 77% of those suffering from gambling 
disorder in Japan.130 
The development of casinos in Japan is a valid cause of concern given 
these rates. To effectively combat problem gambling among its citizens and 
permanent residents, Japan should impose an ex ante entry levy. Although an 
entry levy may alienate a portion of the market, Japan should put the welfare 
and health of its citizens and permanent residents ahead of profits. Indeed, the 
money collected from the entry levies could fund responsible gaming initiatives 
to combat gambling addiction and problem gambling as some Japanese 
                                                            
125  See Jun Hongo, Five Million Japanese Have Gambling Problem, Says Ministry 
Study, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2014, 5:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
japanrealtime/2014/08/22/five-million-japanese-have-gambling-problem-says-
ministry-study; see also Grace Leong, Luck Running Out for Singapore’s Two 
Casinos?, STRAITS TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014, 1:22 AM), http://www.straitstimes. 
com/news/opinion/eye-the-economy/story/luck-running-out-singapores-two-
casinos-20140924; Howard Stutz, Singapore Casinos Produce $6 billion in 
Gaming Revenue in 2013; Market Still Trails Las Vegas Strip, LAS VEGAS REV. J. 
(Feb 21, 2014, 6:26 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/ business/singapore-
casinos-produce-6-billion-gaming-revenue-2013-market-still-trails-las-vegas-strip. 
126  See Naoko Takiguchi & Richard J. Rosenthal, Problem Gambling in Japan: A 
Social Perspective, ELECTRONIC J. OF CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE STUD. (Jan. 31, 
2011), http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/ 2011/Takiguchi.html (including 
pachinko as a gambling activity). 
127  Id. Japan permits pachinko parlors, where players rent silver balls to play the 
game and attempt to win more silver balls. Pachinko does not constitute gambling 
because playing the game for money is illegal and parlors cannot disburse money in 
exchange for the silver balls. Instead, once a player has earned a certain amount of 
silver balls, they can exchange it for a small prize like candy. The player can then 
leave the parlor and exchange the prize for money somewhere else; this is a 
loophole used to circumvent the ban on gambling, although it is widely recognized 
that it closely resembles gambling. Pachinko remains a popular leisure activity in 
Japan today, and the estimated total annual revenues from parlors are $187 billion, 
the largest of any other leisure activity. See Ryan, supra note 4. 
128  See Hongo, supra note 125. 
129  See supra Sections II.A-C. 
130  See Takiguchi & Rosenthal, supra note 126. 
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lawmakers have suggested.131 Further, the goal of the Draft Act is to improve 
the economy by increasing foreign tourism rather than to legalize casino 
gambling for the enjoyment of its residents.132 
III. AGE RESTRICTION 
Research suggests that the availability, accessibility, and exposure to 
gambling are associated with gambling problems.133 Although most studies 
found that gambling problems and younger age are not strongly correlated 
among adults, prevalence rates among adolescents are higher than adults.134 
Further, data from the markets discussed herein suggest that age restrictions 
may not prevent gambling problems, but may delay their onset by limiting 
access and exposure until a person reaches a certain age. All three markets 
discussed herein have set the legal gambling age at twenty-one years, although 
the ages of majority are set at lower ages. Further, Macau and Singapore have 
lower ages to legally consume alcohol. 
A. Las Vegas 
Nevada sets the legal casino gambling age at twenty-one years old.135 
Twenty-one years is also the legal age to consume alcohol in Nevada.136 
However, the age of majority is eighteen years old.137 
Specifically, any person under twenty-one years old may not play, place 
wagers at, or collect winnings from any type of gaming activity, by himself or 
through an agent, nor loiter in any place where licensed gaming activities 
occur.138 In addition, a person under twenty-one years old may not be a gaming 
employee, other than in a counting room.139 
This age restriction correlates with the average age that adult Nevada 
residents start gambling. On average, non-problem gamblers begin gambling at 
twenty-four years old, compared to twenty-two for problem gamblers.140 Thus, 
problem gamblers tend to start gambling earlier than non-problem gamblers, 
                                                            
131  See Entry Levy on Foreigners Mooted for Japan Casinos, GGRASIA (June 18, 
2014), http://www.ggrasia.com/entry-levy-on-foreigners-mooted-for-japan-casinos. 
132  See supra Part II. 
133   See Hellen Miller, Risk Factors for Problem Gambling, VICTORIAN 
RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING FOUND. (May 2015), http://www.responsiblegambling. 
vic.gov.au/__data/ assets/pdf_file/0014/20255/Risk-factors-for-problem-gambling-
web.pdf. 
134  Id. at 8, 10. 
135  NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.350 (2017). 
136  Id. § 202.020. 
137  Id. § 129.010. 
138  Id. § 463.350. 
139  Id. 
140  See VOLBERG, supra note 101, at 36. 
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though the average ages for both groups are over the legal age. This suggests 
that the age restriction is effective in delaying participation in gambling 
activities and the onset of problem gambling. 
Any person who violates or permits the violation of this age restriction, be 
it a licensee, employee, dealer, or other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor.141 
Someone prosecuted for the violation of the age restriction may not use as a 
defense that he or she believed the person was at least twenty-one years old.142 
It is also a misdemeanor for a person to use false identification in order to enter 
or gamble in a gambling establishment.143 
B. Singapore 
Singapore has also set the legal casino gambling age at twenty-one years 
old, but sets the legal age for all other forms of gambling at eighteen.144 
Twenty-one years old is also the age of majority, but the legal age to consume 
alcohol is eighteen.145 
Data on Singapore residents also suggest a correlation between the legal 
gambling age, the average age at which residents first participate in gambling, 
and the average age at which these residents begin to gamble regularly—
though not conclusively. According to the 2014 study, 42% of Singapore 
residents first participated in gambling between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-four years old.146 Further, this was the age range at which about a third 
of both non-problem and problem gamblers began regularly gambling.147 
However, another third of both non-problem and problem gamblers began 
regularly gambling between the ages of thirty and thirty-nine years old, and 
another fifth began regularly gambling between twenty-five and twenty-nine 
years old.148 Therefore, evidence from Singapore residents reveals that, 
although there may be a correlation between age and gambling problems, there 
is not a clear age at which a restriction would prevent or delay development. 
A minor that violates the Singapore age provision is subject to a criminal 
conviction and fine up to $1,000.149 Likewise, a casino operator may be subject 
                                                            
141  NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.350 (2017). 
142  Id. 
143  Id. § 205.460. 
144  See CCA, supra note 71, §§ 130, 132(1); Singapore Totalisator Board Act (Ch. 
305A, 2012 Rev. Ed.) §15(b) (Sing.). 
145  The age of majority in Singapore is the age at which one can enter into a 
binding contract, which is eighteen years old for most contracts. See Civil Law Act 
(Ch. 43, 1999 Rev. Ed.), §§ 35–36 (Sing.) (specifying 21 years old as the legal age 
for contracts involving land and property); Customs Act: Customs (Liquor 
Licensing) Regulations 2009 (Ch. 70, Rg. 3, 2009 Rev. Ed.), §§ 29(2)–(4) (Sing.). 
146  SINGAPORE GAMBLING PARTICIPATION, supra note 84, at 10. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  CCA, supra note 71, § 132(2). 
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to disciplinary action if it permits a minor to enter or remain on the premises 
without a reasonable excuse.150 Casino operators can defend themselves from 
liability by showing that the minor who illicitly gambled was at least sixteen 
years old and provided false identification and claimed to be twenty-one years 
old.151 
C. Macau 
In 2012, Macau changed its age restriction on casino gambling and entry 
from eighteen to twenty-one years of age for residents.152 Further, casinos may 
only employ those who are at least twenty-one years old.153 In contrast, the 
ages of majority and for the purchase or consumption of alcohol in Macau is 
eighteen and sixteen years old, respectively.154 
Similar to Las Vegas, though not as strongly as in Singapore, there may be 
a correlation between gambling participation and the legal age. According to 
the 2014 study, almost half of Macau residents that participate in gambling 
activities are between the ages twenty-two and twenty-nine.155 Thus, most 
gambling participants in Macau are above the legal age for both casino 
gambling and non-casino gambling. However, some underage gambling does 
take place, as 27% of Macau residents between the ages of fifteen and twenty-
one years old participate in gambling activities.156 
Like in Las Vegas, casino operators bear the burden of enforcing the age 
restriction.157 Those under the age of twenty-one years old who violate the 
provision are subject to fines.158 Moreover, the government of Macau, instead 
of the underage player, collects any illicit gambling winnings.159 
D. Recommendation for Japan 
Like in Las Vegas, Singapore, and Macau, Japan should impose an age 
                                                            
150  Id. § 133(1), (3). 
151  Id. §§ 133(5), 136. 
152  See Lei n.º 10/2012, Artigo 2 Interdição de entrada nos casinos [Law 10/2012, 
art. 2 Entry ban on casinos] (2012) (Mac.), http://bo.io.gov.mo/ 
bo/i/2012/35/lei10.asp [hereinafter Law No. 10/2012]. 
153  Id. at Artigo 3 § 1. 
154   Jorge Godinho, Casino Gaming in Macau: Evolution, Regulation and 
Challenges, 5 UNLV GAMING L. J. 1, 18 (2014); David J. Hanson, Minimum Legal 
Drinking Ages Around the World, ALCOHOL: PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS, 
https://www.alcoholproblemsandsolutions.org/ LegalDrinkingAge.html (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2017). 
155  Macau Gambling Participation, supra note 114. 
156   Id. The study includes eighteen to twenty-one year olds in this age range 
making it unclear what proportion is underage gambling. 
157  Law No. 10/2012, supra note 152, at Ch. II, art. 13 § 2(2). 
158  Id. at Ch. II, art. 13 § 1(1). 
159  Id. at Ch. II, art. 11 § 1. 
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restriction on the entry into, and participation in, casino gambling. The age 
restriction will delay access to casino gambling, and likely to the development 
of a gambling problem in certain individuals. Although a higher age 
requirement will increase the delay, the age must be reasonable. 
Japan should set the legal gambling age at twenty years old to comport 
with the ages of majority and consumption of alcohol—both also twenty. This 
age restriction is not only consistent in form, but also in purpose. Adults are 
better able to understand the risks and harmful consequences of gambling and 
thus can make informed decisions about whether to gamble. The age restriction 
will also protect the more susceptible adolescents from developing a gambling 
problem. In addition, the consumption of alcohol can lead to addiction, and 
harmful consequences to the individual and society, just as with problem 
gambling or gambling disorder. To allow for the consumption of alcohol, but 
not gambling, seems arbitrary. 
Casinos are in the best position to enforce the age requirement and should 
bear the burden of enforcement. The privilege of operating a casino provides 
them with great financial resources to implement enforcement mechanisms, and 
curtails the diversion of limited public resources and law enforcement. Further, 
the gambling takes place on casinos’ premises, which casinos secure and 
maintain control. Casinos should be subject to disciplinary action for 
negligently enforcing the age requirement. Discipline of casinos should depend 
on frequency or egregiousness of the violation, and should include substantial 
fines, increased oversight of internal controls, and suspension or revocation of 
gaming licenses. 
Underage patrons should be subject to only minimal criminal liability for 
violating the age restriction. Although underage gambling is potentially 
harmful to the patron, a criminal record may be even more detrimental to his or 
her welfare in scope and duration. A violation should result in an infraction, not 
a misdemeanor or felony, and punishment should include a substantial fine. 
However, if an underage patron continues to violate the restriction, punishment 
should increase with each infraction. 
IV. EXCLUSION 
Apart from age restrictions, governments may invoke other considerations 
to keep its residents and visitors out of casinos. This entails excluding an 
individual from a casino and removing his or her opportunity to gamble there. 
There are two types of exclusion: self-exclusion and third-party exclusion. 
Exclusion can address problem gambling both proactively and retroactively. 
Depending on the type of exclusion, it can either aid in the prevention of 
problem gambling, mitigate the harm from problem gambling, or both. 
Singapore and Macau have more comprehensive exclusion regulations than Las 
Vegas. 
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A. Singapore 
The CCA provides for three types of exclusion from casinos: voluntary 
self-exclusion, family exclusion, and third party exclusion.160 
Voluntary self-exclusion allows a casino patron, including SCPRs and 
foreigners, to submit an application to the Singapore National Council on 
Problem Gambling (NCPG) requesting his or her exclusion from entering or 
participating in any gambling activities on casino premises.161 Self-exclusion 
remains in effect until the patron submits another application for revocation and 
the NCPG approves that application.162 The NCPG may condition the 
revocation approval upon the excluded person’s participation in a counseling, 
rehabilitation, or educational program, or upon consent to an assessment of 
harm from gambling.163 A casino patron, but only one who is an SCPR, can 
also apply for a less strict form of exclusion, which sets a maximum number of 
visits permitted in a month—subject to the same revocation procedures as an 
outright ban.164 As of September 2016, there were 267,426 active self-
exclusions, although only about 8% of those were SCPRs.165 There were 1,465 
active voluntary visit limits, all of which were SCPRs.166 
A family member can also seek exclusion of an individual for a specified 
period by filing an application with the NCPG.167 The NCPG will grant an 
application if, after a hearing, it determines that 1) the patron may cause serious 
harm to his or her family by gambling, 2) exclusion is appropriate and is in the 
best interest of the patron and his or her family, and 3) the patron has had the 
opportunity to respond.168 However, at the family’s request, the NCPG may 
also grant a provisional exclusion order, without providing the patron with 
notice or a hearing, if it finds that the patron has already caused serious harm to 
his or her family and that further harm is imminent.169 The NCPG may refer the 
patron to a counseling, rehabilitation, or educational program, and require the 
                                                            
160  CCA, supra note 71, §§ 159(1), 160, 161. 
161  Id. § 163(2)(b). 
162  Id. § 164(5). 
163  Id. § 163(2)(a). 
164   Id. §§ 165(1)–(2); see also Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Casino Visit 
Limits, NAT’L COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING (last visited on Dec. 8, 2016), 
http://www.ncpg.org.sg/en/Pages/vlfaq.aspx [hereinafter Casino Visit Limits 
FAQs]. 
165  Update of Statistics: Active Casino Exclusions & Visitation Limits, NAT’L 
COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING 1, 2 (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.ncpg.org.sg/ 
en/pdf/Exclusion%20and%20Visit%20Limit%20Statistics%20for%20Media%20R
elease%20(as%20at%2030%20September%202016).pdf [hereinafter EXCLUSION 
STATISTICS]. 
166  Id. 
167  CCA, supra note 71, §§ 159(1)–(2), 163(1). 
168  Id. §§ 162(1)(a)–(c). 
169  See id. § 164(1). 
VALDEZ FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/17  2:23 PM 
Summer 2017] EX ANTE UP 105 
closure of any deposit accounts held with a casino.170 As a less drastic measure, 
a family member can also apply for a limitation on a patron’s monthly visits.171 
As of September 2016, there were 2,284 active family exclusions and 10 active 
family visit limits.172 
Singapore also provides for additional third-party exclusion mechanisms, 
as laid out in the CCA. First, a national default rule automatically excludes 
from casinos any person who receives social assistance or a subsidy through 
any Singapore government program, or any person with an undischarged 
bankruptcy.173 As of September 2016, there were 47,254 active automatic 
exclusions.174 Moreover, the NCPG may exclude someone from casinos, if it 
finds that individual has a poor credit record or is otherwise vulnerable to 
financial harm due to gambling.175 In addition, with or without the patron’s 
request, casino operators themselves may issue or revoke written exclusion 
orders—and must provide notification of doing so to the NCPG and CRA.176 
The CRA, too, may issue or revoke an exclusion order, orally or in writing, but 
must notify the casino operators upon doing so; however, oral exclusion orders 
automatically terminate fourteen days after issuance.177 Lastly, the 
Commissioner of Police may issue or revoke written exclusion orders, provided 
that the Commissioner of Police notify the NCPG and casino operators, and 
that the order is subject to appeal by the excluded person to the Minister for 
Home Affairs.178 An order issued by the CRA and the Commissioner of Police 
is effective until it is affirmatively revoked, it lapses, or is revoked by the 
Minister for Home Affairs on appeal.179 
The NCPG keeps an updated list of all persons excluded under any of the 
above means and provides the list to the CRA, the Commissioner of Police, and 
all casino operators.180 
B. Macau 
The Macanese Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau (DICJ) 
established a system of voluntary self-exclusion and third party exclusion from 
casinos in 2012.181 
                                                            
170  Id. §§ 163(2)(a), (d). 
171  Id. § 163(1)(a). 
172  EXCLUSION STATISTICS, supra note 165, at 2. 
173  CCA, supra note 71, §§ 165(1)(a)–(b). 
174  EXCLUSION STATISTICS, supra note 165, at 2. 
175  CCA, supra note 71, § 165(1)(c). 
176  Id. §§ 120(1), (3). 
177  Id. §§ 121(1)–(3). 
178  Id. §§ 122(1)–(3). 
179  Id. § 123(1). 
180  Id. §§ 168(a)–(d). 
181  See Law No. 10/2012, supra note 152, at Ch. I, art. 6. 
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Any individual, resident or not, can apply for exclusion from all or some 
casinos for themselves with no conditions. By contrast, only a spouse, parent, 
child, or sibling can seek third party exclusion, and the excluded person must 
personally sign the exclusion application.182 Individuals can apply, in person, at 
the DICJ office with proper identification; third party applicants must come 
with a recent photo of the person that they seek to exclude.183 Individuals can 
also apply for exclusion through casinos, after which the DICJ will contact the 
applicant to confirm his or her personal information.184 Lastly, the excluded 
person can also choose whether they want to receive counseling for problem 
gaming.185 
Within five working days of the application, the DICJ will notify the 
applicant of its approval and provide official dates of exclusion, which typically 
last for two years and automatically expire.186 Once the exclusion takes effect, 
the subject may not enter specified casinos.187 
Only the excluded person can apply for revocation of the exclusion, in 
person at the DICJ office; if approved, the revocation goes into effect thirty 
days thereafter.188 After the exclusion period terminates, due to either 
revocation or expiration, the subject may apply for an extension—following the 
same process as an initial application.189 
A violation by the excluded person constitutes a crime of simple 
disobedience.190 Casinos that commit a violation by allowing an excluded 
person to gamble, even with mere negligence, are subject to fines.191 
C. Las Vegas 
Nevada does not mandate a system of voluntary casino self-exclusion in 
the manner that Singapore and Macau do.192 Instead, Nevada strictly regulates 
casinos that issue credit, cash checks, or market gaming opportunities by direct 
                                                            
182  Isolation from Casinos, GAMING INSPECTION & COORDINATION BUREAU 
MACAO SAR, http://www.dicj.gov.mo/web/en/responsible/isolation/isolation. 
html#2 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. 
186  Id. 
187  Id. 
188  Id. 
189  Id. 
190  Id. 
191  Law No. 10/2012, supra note 152, at Ch. II, art. 13 § 2(2). 
192   Although not required by statute or regulation, some casino operators have 
taken the initiative to provide self-exclusion programs like those in Macau and 
Singapore. See generally Caesars Entertainment’s Commitment to Responsible 
Gaming, CAESARS ENTM’T, http://caesarscorporate.com/about-caesars/responsible-
gaming (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
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mail.193 The state requires that these casinos implement programs that allow 
patrons to “self-limit” their access to these services but not casino gambling 
itself.194 Further, the casinos must inform patrons that these programs exist, 
provide patrons with written opportunities to participate, and establish 
procedures and forms that require self-limited individuals to notify the casino 
within ten days of the receipt of any financial gaming privilege, material, or 
promotion.195 
Although individuals may not exclude themselves or their loved ones, the 
Nevada Gaming Commission (NGC) reserves the power to exclude or eject 
individuals from gaming establishments by adding them to a state exclusion 
list.196 This type of third-party exclusion only applies to gaming establishments 
that conduct pari-mutuel wagering or operate any race book, sports pool or 
games; it does not apply to establishments that operate only slot machines.197 
Most casinos in Nevada feature more gambling activities than simply slot 
machines, and thus the exclusion power applies to them.198 
However, this mechanism seemingly aims to protect casinos and the 
gaming industry rather than patrons because the NGC adds a person to this 
exclusion list only if the NGC determines his or her presence in a gaming 
establishment poses a threat to the interests of the state, to licensed gaming, or 
to both.199 In making this determination, the NGC and Gaming Control Board 
may consider: (1) prior felony convictions, convictions of crimes involving 
moral turpitude, and/or violations of the gaming laws of any state; (2) violation 
or conspiracy to violate the Nevada Gaming Control Act by failing to disclose 
an interest in a gaming establishment, or willfully evading fees or taxes; (3) a 
notorious reputation that may suggest to the public that the gaming industry is 
not free from crime or corruption; and (4) orders from any governmental 
agency which authorizes the exclusion from a gaming establishment described 
above.200 These criteria clearly focus on the potential harm to the casino 
industry by patrons rather than the patrons’ potential harm from gambling. 
The Gaming Control Board must provide notice to any person placed on 
the exclusion list.201 The excluded person may request a hearing to challenge 
the exclusion within thirty or sixty days of receiving notice, depending on the 
type of notice given.202 The NGC must hold the hearing within thirty days 
                                                            
193  Nev. Gaming Reg. § 5.170(4) (2017). 
194  Id. 
195  Id. 
196  NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.151 (2017). 
197  Id. 
198  Grocery stores and gas stations operate only slot machines, so exclusion is not 
available for these locations. See id. 
199  Id. 
200  Id. 
201  NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.152 (2017). 
202  NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.153(1) (2017). 
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thereafter.203 If the excluded person fails to timely request a hearing, or if the 
NGC determines that the exclusion was proper, he or she may petition for 
judicial review.204 
A casino that knowingly fails to exclude or eject a person on the list may 
be subject to penalties.205 An excluded person who enters a gaming 
establishment is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.206 
D. Recommendation for Japan 
Japan should include an ex ante regulation establishing a system of self-
exclusion and third party exclusion. These regulations should mirror those of 
Singapore and Macau, and primarily aim to protect casino patrons rather than 
the casinos and the gaming industry. 
Voluntary self-exclusion may prevent problem gambling and associated 
harms, if made available prior to the establishment of casinos. Those who feel 
susceptible to addiction or recognize that they are not in the financial position 
to participate in casino gambling may protect themselves by applying for 
exclusion before being faced with the gambling temptation. In addition, self-
exclusion may mitigate potential harm for those Japanese residents who are 
already problem gamblers. The procedure for obtaining voluntary self-
exclusion should not be lengthy or complicated otherwise it may discourage 
people from starting or completing the process. 
Moreover, immediate family members should be able to obtain third party 
exclusion on behalf of the patron. Although people should have free choice to 
engage in legal, albeit potentially harmful activity, those in need may not seek 
out help of their own accord or may do so only when they have already 
incurred significant harm.207 In these instances, immediate family members 
may be in the position to recognize a problem and seek exclusion. Further, 
immediate family members may suffer their own harm because of the gambling 
of their relative. However, the excluded person should have the opportunity to 
object and to be heard by an authority before the approval of an exclusion 
application, so as to comport with notions of due process, as in Singapore. 
Japanese government authorities and casino operators themselves should 
also be able to exclude patrons, though only after providing the patron to 
formally object—as in both Singapore and Las Vegas. In addition, Japan 
should exclude, by default, anyone who receives government aid or social 
                                                            
203  Id. 
204  Id. 
205  NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.154 (2017). 
206  NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.155 (2017). 
207   For example, in Nevada, although 51.2% of problem gamblers felt nervous 
about their gambling, only 7% had ever sought help for their gambling problem, 
compared to non-problem gamblers with 18.1% and 0.3%, respectively. See 
VOLBERG, supra note 101, at 36, 38. 
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welfare, has an undischarged bankruptcy, or has any unresolved financial liens 
or judgments. These individuals are not in the financial position to participate 
in gambling, nor should they be using public or encumbered funds for 
gambling purposes. 
Exclusion periods should last at least one year, during which time the 
excluded person must participate in a counseling or treatment program for 
problem gambling. Such programs should be free of charge and available to 
both excluded and non-excluded persons, and funded by taxes or fees on the 
IRs and their entry levies. Revocations should not be easy to obtain and should 
require a hearing to assess whether revocation is appropriate. Hearings should 
not occur within at least thirty days of the grant of the exclusion order to 
prevent unhealthy impulse decisions. 
Casino operators should bear the burden of enforcing these exclusions and 
limitations for the same reason as enforcing the age restriction. An electronic 
system, similar to that used to verify the age information and authenticity of a 
government issued ID, could quickly verify that the person is not on an 
exclusion list. Casino operators that negligently violate this regulation by 
permitting an excluded person to enter its premises should be subject to 
substantial fines. 
Japan should also provide for formally imposed limitations, including on 
the number of visits per month or the amount of money with which to gamble. 
However, the penalties for exceeding these limitations and the requirement to 
participate in mandatory counseling or treatment should be less severe and 
demanding than those involving total exclusion. 
V. EXTENSION OF GAMBLING CREDIT 
The extension of gambling credit allows patrons to borrow money with 
which to gamble instead of using their own funds. Gambling credit is an area of 
concern because patrons incur these debts specifically to gamble, which may 
lead to other financial and social harms. These social harms may especially 
threaten problem gamblers because they spend more money on gambling than 
non-problem gamblers. Las Vegas, Singapore, and Macau permit the extension 
of gambling credit, though with vastly different regulations. 
A. Singapore 
Singapore regulates the extension of casino credit to SCPRs more strictly 
than to foreign gamblers. This policy is sensible because those suffering from 
gambling disorder in Singapore bet, on average, approximately 4.5 times the 
amount than regular gamblers.208 
The CCA states that casino operators may only provide gambling chips on 
                                                            
208  See SINGAPORE GAMBLING PARTICIPATION, supra note 84, at 14. 
VALDEZ FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/17  2:23 PM 
110 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:85 
credit to patrons who are not SCPRs, to patrons who are premium players, or to 
licensed international market agents.209 International market agents may also 
only provide chips on credit to a person that is not an SCPR.210 
The CCA defines a premium player as a patron who opens a deposit 
account with the casino operator and deposits at least S$100,000 to use in the 
casino.211 Once the patron makes the initial deposit, he or she remains a 
premium player for twelve months; however, the patron ceases to be a premium 
player if the account falls below S$100,000 for a continuous twelve months.212 
This patron’s premium player status renews whenever he or she deposits 
additional money and the account again reaches S$100,000.213 
Both foreign gamblers and SCPRs can become premium players; however, 
the CCA provides different regulations accordingly.214 Casino operators and 
international market agents can grant credit to foreign patrons to meet the 
deposit to become a premium player, but may not do so for SCPRs.215 Premium 
players that are SCPRs can only obtain chips on credit if: (1) he or she registers 
and qualifies for a credit program with the casino operator; (2) his or her 
creditworthiness satisfies the casino operator’s credit policies, procedures, and 
controls; and (3) he or she draws from a deposit account and gambles with at 
least S$100,000, excluding winnings.216 Casino operators may continue to grant 
an SCPR credit without requiring re-registration, if he or she remains a 
premium player at all times.217 
If a casino operator violates any of these provisions, it is subject to 
disciplinary action, including cancellation or suspension of its casino license, 
censure, variation to the terms of its casino license, and/or financial 
penalties.218 An SCPR who attempts to obtain chips on credit by falsely 
representing themselves as a foreign patron is guilty of a criminal offense and 
subject to twelve months imprisonment and a S$10,000 fine.219 Gambling debt 
is a civil issue and is enforceable in civil courts.220 
                                                            
209  CCA, supra note 71, §§ 108(7)(a), (b). 
210  Id. 
211  Id. § 2(1). 
212   Casino Control Act (Ch. 33A, 2013 Rev Ed) Casino Control (Credit) 
(Amendment) § 61, at 3, http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/download/0/0/pdf/binaryFile/ 
pdfFile.pdf?CompId:9aacc728-1b8d-441c-b57e-3406b62c6d65 (Sing.) [hereinafter 
CCCR]. 
213  Id. at 3–4. 
214  Id. at 4. 
215  Id. at 2. 
216  Id. at 6. 
217  Id. at 7. 
218  CCA, supra note 71, §§ 54(1)(a)–(d). 
219  CCCR, supra note 212, at 11. 
220  See CCA, supra note 71, §§ 40(c), 108(1); but see Civil Law Act, supra note 
145, §§ 5(1)–(2), (6). 
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B. Macau 
China has strict control over its currency, permitting Chinese individuals to 
take only a limited amount of money, approximately USD $3,300, overseas 
each day.221 Thus, gamblers from Mainland China cannot enter Macau with 
more than that amount of money, and are limited to that amount, less all other 
expenses, with which to gamble. There are both legal and illegal means to 
circumvent this limitation, some of which closely resemble, or are indeed, 
illegal money laundering.222 
One legal alternative comes from authorized gambling credit, which makes 
up a large portion of Macau’s gross gaming revenue.223 Before 2004, all 
gambling credit was illegal as the crime of usury for gaming.224 However, in 
July 2004, the Gaming Credit Law became effective, legalizing and regulating 
gambling credit in Macau.225 The law authorizes only three types of gambling 
creditor-borrower relationships: a concessionaire or sub-concessionaire as 
grantor and an individual patron as borrower; an authorized gaming promoter—
similar to an international market agent in Singapore—as grantor and an 
individual patron as borrower; and a concessionaire or sub-concessionaire as 
grantor and an authorized gaming promoter as borrower.226 The Macanese 
government regulates authorized gaming promoters by requiring them to obtain 
a license.227 
Grantors may not grant credit through third parties, effectively prohibiting 
the assignment or transfer of their permission.228 The Gaming Credit Law sets 
an interest rate, if one is not otherwise stipulated, and also limits any interest 
amount to no greater than three times the set legal rate.229 Further, the penalty 
rate in the event of a default is usurious if it exceeds five times the legal rate.230 
Gambling credit debts are legally enforceable as civil debt in both Macau 
                                                            
221  Frank Langfitt, China’s Corruption Crackdown Pummels Macau Casinos, NPR 
(Nov. 7, 2014, 3:36 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/11/07/ 
360177247/china-s-corruption-crackdown-pummels-macau-casinos. 
222  Id. 
223  Godinho, supra note 154 at 6. 
224  Id. 
225  See id.; see also Lei n.º 5/2004, Artigo 3 Concedentes de credito [Law 5/2004, 
art. 3 Credit Grantors] (2004) (Mac.), http://bo.io.gov.mo/ bo/i/2004/24/lei05.asp 
[hereinafter Law No. 5/2004]. 
226  Id., art. 3 § 1(6). 
227   Id., art. 3 § 2; see also Lei n. º 6/2002, Artigo 6 Condições de acesso à 
actividade [Law 6/2002, art. 6 Conditions of Access to the Activity] (2002) (Mac.), 
http://dicj.gov.mo/web/pt/legislation/FortunaAzar/regAdem_ 02_006.html. 
228  Id., art. 5. 
229   See id.; see also Código Civil de Macao Artigo 1073 Usura [Civil Code of 
Macau, art. 1073 Usury] (1999) (Mac.), http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/99/31/ 
codcivpt/codciv1001.asp [hereinafter Civil Code of Macau]. 
230  Civil Code of Macau, supra note 229, art. 1073 § 2. 
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and Hong Kong; however, they are not enforceable in Mainland China.231 Thus, 
gamblers from Macau are exposed to financial harm if they are not able to pay 
gambling debts. This is a cause of concern given that Macau residents gambled 
the most amount of money in Macanese casinos compared to the amounts 
gambled in other activities.232 Indeed, the average monthly amount gambled in 
Macanese casinos was eight times higher than that of the lottery.233 
C. Las Vegas 
Casinos in Las Vegas extend credit to gamblers for use in their casinos, 
commonly called “markers.”234 Markers are similar to interest-free loans that 
require repayment at a future time.235 Casinos use credit as a marketing strategy 
to attract more patrons to gamble at their establishment.236 Nearly 40% of all 
wagers are made through markers.237 Further, 30% of resident gamblers 
maintain casino credit.238 
A patron seeking a marker from a casino must first submit an application 
similar to that required for a personal loan.239 These applications ensure that he 
or she is in the financial position to repay the marker.240 Subsequent markers 
are easier to obtain and patrons typically receive them without going through 
the initial application process, especially if he or she has a good history of 
repayment with the casino.241 Casino hosts may also approve a requested 
marker without requiring much paperwork.242 These hosts may be more willing 
to approve a marker because their compensation includes a portion of the 
patron’s losses resulting from that marker.243 
To maintain a pleasant relationship with patrons who have markers, 
casinos allow lengthy periods before repayment—even several months.244 
Markers can grow to be several hundreds of thousands of dollars before they 
come due.245 Because these markers are interest-free, the casino takes a risk of 
                                                            
231  Godinho, supra note 154, at 6. 
232  Macau Gambling Participation, supra note 114. 
233  Id. 
234   Casinos and Debt Collection, STOPPREDATORYGAMBLING.ORG, 
http://stoppredatorygambling.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/SPG-Memo-
Casinos-and-Debt-Collection-notes.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
235  Id. 
236  Id. 
237  Id. 
238  LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., supra note 98, at 4. 
239  Casinos and Debt Collection, supra note 234. 
240  Id. 
241  Id. 
242  Id. 
243  Id. 
244  Id. 
245  Id. 
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loss if the patron does not pay the marker.246 Indeed, casinos write off millions 
of dollars every year as uncollectible debts.247 
Markers are also risky for the individual patron if he or she is unable to pay 
them. Under Nevada law, if the patron does not pay the marker, a casino can 
file a claim with the Clark County District Attorney’s Office to prosecute 
because this is theoretically equivalent to the crime of writing a bad check.248 
Nevada is the only market discussed herein, and the only state in the Union, 
that imposes both civil and criminal penalties on patrons who do not pay their 
casino debts.249 If the amount of money is $650 or less, it constitutes a 
misdemeanor offense; if the amount is more than $650, it is a category D 
felony.250 
Casinos frequently refer patrons with unpaid debts to the District Attorney 
because, in addition to criminal punishment, the patron must also pay 
restitution.251 Essentially, this process makes the District Attorney, using public 
resources, the casino’s debt collector of private funds.252 The District Attorney 
also receives collection fees, providing an incentive to prosecute.253 
Alternatively, the casinos may file a civil claim against the patron if the district 
attorney chooses not to prosecute or if that process will be too lengthy.254 
D. Recommendation for Japan 
Japan should prohibit the extension of gambling credit ex ante, at least to 
its citizens and permanent residents. Although the three comparative markets 
here permit this practice, there are strong arguments against it. 
First, extending credit puts a patron in a leveraged financial position in 
order to participate in gambling. The risk of loss or default is high given that 
the odds of winning are ultimately against the borrower. Someone who cannot 
afford exposure to losses from his or her current assets, or does not feel 
comfortable losing those current assets, should not incur an additional liability 
from which to lose instead. This is especially important for problem gamblers 
who are willing to withstand higher losses.255 
                                                            
246  Id. 
247  Id. 
248  Id. 
249  Id. 
250  NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.130 (2017). 
251  Casinos and Debt Collection, supra note 234. 
252  Id. 
253  Id. 
254  Id. 
255  In Nevada, problem gamblers were more likely to lose larger amounts of money 
both daily and annually than non-problem gamblers. For example, 69.8% of 
problem gamblers lost $1,000 or more in a single year, compared to 25.8% of non-
problem gamblers. Further, 38.6% of problem gamblers lost $1,000 or more in a 
single day, compared to only 9.3% of non-problem gamblers. See VOLBERG, supra 
VALDEZ FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/17  2:23 PM 
114 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:85 
Second, granting credit can become predatory: casinos might become eager 
to extend easy credit to patrons with poor credit in order to attract them to play 
at their establishment; unregulated interest rates may be usurious; and the terms 
of repayment may be uncertain or spawn defaults. Further, incentivizing credit 
extension by paying commission on the losses of those borrowers, as in Las 
Vegas, heightens these concerns. 
Third, casinos should not extend credit because of the risk of default and 
the potential losses that they will have to write down as uncollectible debt. 
Although the gambling debts of citizens and permanent residents will likely be 
enforceable within Japan, they may not be enforceable in other countries from 
which patrons come, especially China. 
If, despite these policy considerations, Japan permits the extension of 
gambling credit, then it should use Singapore as the model. Regulations should 
require citizens and permanent residents to prove that they are financially stable 
through a deposit account and to demonstrate that they can risk loss by drawing 
down the full amount in the account for gambling. However, gamblers should 
have to maintain some premium player status by keeping a certain amount in an 
account. There should also be a thorough credit screening procedure to ensure 
creditworthiness of the borrower. Further, Japan should enforce gambling debt 
under the civil code and not the criminal code. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Macau, Las Vegas, and Singapore, as well as many other gaming markets, 
have reaped the economic rewards of booming casino industries. Japan has the 
potential to do the same and become a leading gaming market in the world if it 
legalizes casino gambling. However, most legal and business propositions, 
especially those that present a profound change, involve a great deal of risk. 
Some risks are immediate and some risks present themselves over time. The 
already high prevalence of gambling problems is one that Japan faces 
immediately, even before the establishment of casinos. Further, problem 
gambling and its associated harms have the potential to increase and burden 
Japanese society for long after the establishment of casinos. 
Japanese lawmakers must carefully consider regulations to implement at 
the outset of legalization, or ex ante, in order to effectively combat problem 
gambling and its harm. Japanese lawmakers can justify implementing ex ante 
regulations by looking at the existing regulations of the top gaming markets in 
the world. These markets have already served as the laboratories of casino 
regulation, providing not only regulatory frameworks, but also data of the 
results these markets have had. This Article recommends to Japanese 
lawmakers regulations to implement ex ante based on this valuable 
information. 
                                                            
note 101, at 37. 
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Lastly, while ex ante regulations are crucial in combatting problem 
gambling and its harms, ex post regulations may be even more important. As 
Macau, Las Vegas, and Singapore have all learned, there are inevitable social, 
economic, and political changes that demand the same of existing regulations. 
To continue to be effective, Japanese lawmakers must amend or repeal these 
regulations, as well as enact new regulations, in response changing 
circumstances. However, Japan should always prioritize the health and welfare 
of its citizens and residents in its regulatory decisions, rather than purely 
economic pursuits. 
 
